The Third of the Body

(a pre-final version which still needs some rhetorical and stylistic care)

What I mean by the Third in the following discussion is a category emerging from the encounter of the same and the other – the encounter all too frequently leaving out an undefined space of the inbetween. Otherness, one of the key concepts of the contemporary discourse of the humanities, relies on the principle of *tertium non datur*, the excluded middle, which leaves no realm beyond the binary. The origin of this exclusion is rooted in what generally might be called a rationalist stance: from Descartes to structuralism, for which the binary opposition was the basis of defining linguistic and cultural reality. Even though, despite the demise of structuralism itself, binary thinking still persists and dominates, manifestations of the Third can be observed in some areas of modern thought alongside tendencies towards binarism. One of such manifestations – surprisingly, a rationalist one – is Peirce’s concept of Thirdness as synthesis or law (having its distant predecessor in the Hegelian *Aufhebung*). Another is Bakhtin’s *chronotopos*, as the third of space and time. In poststructuralist (or pre-poststructuralist¹) thought, the Third reveals itself in such concepts as Kristeva’s pre-linguistic semiotics and her use of *chora*, in Deleuzian notions of *pure game* and the fold, or in Derrida’s *différance* and supplement as a surplus of meaning. A more obvious manifestation of the Third is the idea of hybridity frequently foregrounded in the postmodern/poststructuralist discourse.

In short, the Third, in a fuzzy, nebulous form, occupies the place both overlapping and bracketting binaries. It is in this context and this mode that I want to take up the question of the body, its other and the third that emerges from their encounter. The approach adopted in my argument is not that of “objectifying” the body as a matter separate, or even alien to the mind, but rather a hermeneutics of the lived body, including the (inter-)subjective experience.

The body, in the let’s say Cartesian or classical framework, defines itself within the dichotomy inside – outside. A strong impulse to overcome that dichotomy comes

¹ I am using this word to refer to ides chronologically placed in structuralism, but conceptually breaking away with its logic.
from the feminist rethinking of the body, and more specifically of the “rethinking the
relations between the inside and the outside of the subject […] by showing […] the tor-
sion of the one into another, the passsage vector or uncontrollable drift of the inside into
the outside and the outside into the inside.” (Grosz 1994: xii) The feminist objective,
generally speaking, is “to reclaim the body from the realms of immanence and biology
in order to see it as a psycho-social product.” (Grosz 1999: 270) While leaving aside the
ideological and political aspect of the the feminist critique of the body, I will consider
their claims and explorations on the one hand as a significant contribution and, on the
other hand, as a manifestation of the tendency in contemporary discourse toward to-
wards a “non-dichotomous understanding of the body” (Grosz 1994: 21), and towards
overcoming and questioning the body’s immanence.

Within the poststructuralist/postmodernist paradigm, rather than of bodily states
of affairs defined by the clear cut inside/outside dichotomy, we should speak of proceses
of internalization and externalization – processes which tend towards their goal (and are
thus teleological processes) but never fully succeed. Externalization and internalization –
and not the stabililizing categories of the inside and the outside – are the two types of
the dynamics of the body’s interaction with the world. The externalized always retains
an element of sameness with the body, and the internalized retains a moment of other-
ness. It is at this junction that the Third appears. Yet, rather than in terms of the proc-
eses leading to its emergence – while keeping in mind its ever dynamic quality – it
seems more productive, because more directly related to the present cultural discourse,
to analyse the Third in terms of the lived experience of boundary overlap. I will, there-
fore, concentrate on three of its most pervasive manifestations: the pro-ject, the ab-ject
and the in/ter-ject.

Pro-ject

The lived body is not confined to to the anatomical flesh, clearly separated from
its outside – the realm of otherness – but encompasses what has been variously been
called phenomenal body, body image or gestallt, the imaginary body, the corporeal
schema or the body schema (cf. Gatens 1999: 231; Grosz 1994; Gallagher and Cole
1998), or what from a more generalizing perspective can be seen as a manifestation of
the body’s Third. The idea goes back to Henry Head’s notion of “postural schema,” or
“postural model” of the body: “It is to the existence of these ‘schemata’ that we owe the power of projecting our recognition of posture, movement, and locality beyond the limits of our own bodies to the end of some instrument held in the hand. [...] Anything which participates in the conscious movement of our bodies is added to the model of ourselves and becomes part of these schemata.” (Head and Holmes 1911: 188; quoted in Grosz 1994: 66, emphasis mine). In other words, the subject’s corporeal experience and awareness reaches beyond the limits defined by physical boundaries. An effectual and appealing example of this transgression is the so-called phantom limb, the term (coined by a physician S. Weir Mitchell) describing the phenomenal experience of a limb that has in some way been severed, but remains a source of pain.

The quasi-presence of a phantom limb is only an emblematic manifestation of a more obvious presence – a corporeal transgression which, however, does not take on physical or corporeal substance, but which is still lived as part of corporeal experience. Especially valuable and relevant to the question of body boundaries – or, more exactly, questioning the definitive binarity of the inside-outside dichotomy with reference to the experience of body limits – is the work of Elizabeth Grosz, who questions the long-established interpretation of the phantom limb experience. Contrary to traditional psychology, to which the phantom limb is a memory, Grosz follows the neurophysiologist Paul Schilder in treating the phantom limb as a (deficient) part of the body image and one of the proofs of the validity of this concept: “The phantom limb is not a memory or an image (of something now absent). It is ‘quasi-present.’ It is the refusal of an experience to enter into the past; it illustrates the tenacity of a present that remains immutable.” (Grosz 1994: 89).

Following Schilder’s early and more recent research, and also relating to the work of Lacan on the early stages of infant’s development, Grosz questions the self-perception of the body as defined by anatomical limits: “The limits or the borders of the body image are not fixed by nature or confined to the anatomical ‘container,’ the skin. The body image is extremely fluid and dynamic; its borders, edges and contours are ‘osmotic’ – they have the remarkable power of incorporating and expelling outside and inside in an ongoing interchange.” (Grosz 1994: 79) She also discerns a similar transgression of bodily confinement in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of those philosophers who persisted in subverting, or as we might say today, deconstructing the polarizing binarism of dichotomous thinking. As Grosz observes, Merleau-Ponty “af-
firms Schilder’s notion of the plasticity of the body image, adding to it the philosophical idea of the body image’s crucial function in establishing the lived space and time of the subject.” (Grosz 1994: 91) Body image thus mediates between consciousness and space in which the body lives and interacts with objects.

A terminological remark is in place here. Some authors postulate a conceptual differentiation between the body image and the body schema. Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Cole, in a paper which originally appeared in The Journal of Mind and Behavior in 1995, propose the conscious or unconscious operation as the criterion for distinction. For them, the body image “consists of a complex set of intentional states – perceptions, mental representations, beliefs and attitudes – in which the intentional object of such states is one’s own body. Thus the body image involves a reflective intentionality.” (Gallagher and Cole 1998: 132) Body schema, on the other hand, even though it “can have specific effects of cognitive experience […] it does not have the status of a conscious representation or belief.” Body schema “involves a system of moto capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance of posture.” (Gallagher and Cole 1998: 132) As such, body schema “can be functionally integrated with the environment, even to the extent that it frequently incorporates certain objects into its operations – the hammer in the carpenter’s hand, the feather in the woman’s hat, and so forth.” (Gallagher and Cole 1998: 132) However, as the writers also observe, “More permanent attachments to the body – such as prosthetic devices – can become incorporated into both the image and the schema of the body affecting our bearing and approach to the world in both conscious projection and movement. Similarly some prostheses and even clothes greatly affect the way in which we view ourselves and our personal image.” (Gallagher and Cole 1998: 133)

While Gallagher and Cole may have their more specific disciplinary reasons for making the distinction between body image and body schema, I follow the more dominant tradition (dating back to Schilder’s earlier work) of using both terms interchangeably, without distinguishing between conscious and unconscious components of the experience, and referring generally to what Grosz calls “a ‘fictional’ or fantasmatic construction of the body outside or beyond its neurological structure” (Grosz 1994: 89). In this sense, the body image or schema, construed as spatiotemporal projection the subject’s body occupies the ambivalent position between the body itself and its “outside”; being neither the body itself nor its other, it belongs to the body as its Third. As body’s
Third, it mediates between the body and its externality, the outside world, while involving both as its components.

This mediation, it has to be emphasised, consists of a two-directional movement. In one sense, body image is then an effect of the negotiation of the body with space, a carving out from the outer space of a spacial (perpetually dynamic) fragment – a lived space which is body’s own and incorporated into its image. Conversely, this process of projection involves its reversed double: the formation of the body image consists also in an incorporation of otherness, which then ceases to be otherness and becomes the body’s third: “External objects, implements, and instruments with which the subject continually interacts become, while they are being used, intimate, vital, even libidinally cathected parts of body image.” (Grosz 1994: 80). The absorption of the other, then, may occur not only on the level of language (ideology, prejudices. etc.), but also at the pre-rational level of the body; and, paradoxically, through its double projection into and of the surrounding space: “The body and its various sensations are projected onto the world, and conversly the world and its vicissitudes are introjected into the body of the subject-to-be.” (Grosz 1994: 74)

It is also important to observe that the body image is determined not only by the subject’s individual psycho-somatic constitution, but also by the socio-historical and cultural context. This is clearly manifest in the phenomenon of the so-called personal space: an intrusion into the space around the body is considered an infringement upon the self’s (and the body’s) privacy – obviously an individual response – but the various types of distance delimiting this personal space in different cultures result from socio-cultural determination. Consequently, there is a similar individial/cultural parallel in the dynamics of the body image. On the one hand, it is subject to change on the diachronical axis of the subject’s individual development: the body image changes, as Schilder claims following Freud, from early childhood throughout the subject’s life, and may undergo major transformations in the case of psychic illness. At the same time, alterations in the socio-cultural context – through its conceptual apparatus, hierarchies of values, conventions etc. – will effect changes in individual body images.

What follows from the above remarks, then, is that body image, as Third, is subversive of boundaries and dichotomies in two senses: on the one hand – by constituting a realm of the subject’s bodily reach extending beyond the physical flesh but experienced as a condition and part of the body’s functioning – it undermines the clear-cut
spatial boundaries between the corporeal inside and the outside world. On the other hand, it also undermines the body-mind duality: the lived experience of the world occurs in an inseparable interaction of body and mind projected into space.

**Ab-ject**

While the generally positive connotation of the pro-ject, as an effect of projection, is contained in the ambiguous morpheme pro- (forward, but also for), the ab-ject – even though it also pertains to body boundaries and margins – is the pro-ject’s opposite. In two major and most influential discussions – by Mary Douglas and Julia Kristeva – it is identified with danger and horror, and relegated, albeit for different reasons, to the sphere of dirt, taboo, and impurity. Both Douglas and Kristeva approach the abject in negative terms: Douglas in terms of danger of the margin to social homogeneity, Kristeva in terms of expulsion, but related to an individual (and primarily female) subject.

Mary Douglas, in her anthropological analysis of the concept of pollution and taboo in Purity and Danger – the book, whose inspiration for Kristeva is more than obvious – aims at demonstrating how the danger inflicted to bodily boundaries (or to the symbolism of those boundaries) symbolically coincides with danger inflicted to community boundaries. (Douglas actually does not use the terms abject, abjection, but refuse, excrement, matter issuing from … etc.) While analysing rites related to pollution, she opposes views reducing such rites to individual preoccupation with (the danger of) pollution of the body. Working on the assumption that “the symbolism of body’s boundaries is used […] to express danger to community boundaries,” she claims that purity of the body reflects and symbolizes the integrity of a community: “When rituals express anxiety about the body’s orifices, the sociological counterpart of of this anxiety is a care to protect the political and cultural unity of a minority. […] The threatened boundaries of their [Israelites, in this case] body politic would be well mirrored in their care for the integrity, unity and purity of the physical body. […] The anxiety about bodily margins expresses danger to group survival. […] The rituals work upon the body politic through the symbolic medium of the physical body.” (Douglas 2002: 152-154, 159) Yet, even if on the broader and more general anthropological level one has to appreciate Douglas’s contention that “the analysis of ritual symbolism cannot begin until
we recognize ritual as an attempt to create and maintain a particular culture,” at the basis of this ritual lies the ambivalent status of that which subverts the clarity and purity of bodily margin.

Kristeva approaches the abject from the feminist psychoanalytical perspective (and reproaches Douglas for what truly is a merit of the latter’s book: namely that “a hasty assimilation of […] data leads Mary Douglas naively to reject Freudian premises,” (Kristeva 1982: 66), a rather conceited comment given Kristeva’s indebtedness to Douglas’s analyses). Throughout Powers of Horror, abjection emerges as a broad concept relating to what threatens the subject’s identity, being neither completely the other nor fully a part of the subject’s sameness. Primarily, however, abjection relates to the pre-oedipal moment of the separation of the infant from the mother (or, more exactly, the mother’s body) and the consequent entrance into the (Lacanian) Symbolic Order and the submission under the Law of the Father. In the context of the prelinguistic mapping of the body (maternal, according to Kristeva) as opposed to the symbolic (paternal) and, consequently, linguistic order abjection may be seen as a semantic concept, an interesting instance of the meaning’s third. Here, however, I want to concentrate on the corporeal aspect of abjection – the abject in its physical form. I will abstract here from Kristeva’s ideological purposes and the purposes of the feminist discourse her work has generated, whose objective is to undermine the patriarchal hierarchy of clear-cut bodily cleanliness (male) as opposed to “dirt” and “horrifying” abjection (female). What interests me rather is the opposition against the Cartesian-driven ontology of solidity and separateness.

This solidity may be exemplified by the concept of body construed as container, as delineated, for example by Mark Johnson: “Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of our bodily experience.” (Johnson 1987: 21) On Johnson’s account, reflecting the (apparently) generally shared experience, we apprehend our bodies as “three-dimensional containers” into which various things, like food and fluids, are put, and from which other things come out. Yet the proclaimed obviousness of the shared experience of self-containment is obviously undermined by the ambiguous nature of the substances issuing from the body – the abject.

The disturbance between the clear-cut opposition between the body and its other by the third, the abject, occurs on two planes. In what might be called the soft version or plane, even though involving physical abject matter, it refers to the self-constitution of
the subject. Judith Butler rightly observes that „the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constituted outside of the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, ‘inside’ the subject as its own founding repudiation.” (Butler 1999: 237). In other words, if the subject’s identity – including corporeal identity – is constituted in opposition to the refused abject, then the “trace” of the abject itself is incorporated into subjectivity: the psychological and cognitive ambiguity reconfirms thus physical ambiguity. The operation of the Third as abject coalesces here partly with the Third of the body image; the organic objects, the separated bits of the body and its by-products or waste products also constitute a part of the body image: “The voice, the breath, the odour, faeces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, are still parts of the body image even when separated in space from the body.” (Schilder 1978: 213)

On the other plane – in its hard material version – what further undermines the I/Other, inside/ outside opposition is the ambiguous ontological status of the abject with respect to body’s identity: “The abject is what of the body falls away from it while remaining irreducible to the subject/object and inside/outside oppositions. The abject necessarily partakes of both polarized terms but cannot be clearly identified with either.” (Grosz 1994: 192) And, as Grosz observes earlier, these rejected organic components “retain something of the cathexis and value of a body part even when they are separated from the body.” (Grosz 1994: 81). Important here is the temporal determination of spacial inclusion/exclusion: the moment of radical separation from the body of what has been a part of its apparent totality – the moment extended to a continuum through the permanent activity of the flesh refusing itself. In the ontological sense, the abject vacillates between the body and non-body; what is now me (my nails, my hair, my mucus) in a moment may become not-me (the abject): “Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either.” (Kristeva 1982: 2) The Third.

Furthermore, most of the abject substances (apart from hair, nails, scab and crust) are fluid, which further destabilizes the solidity of the body. These body fluids, as Elizabeth Grosz observes, “attest to the permaebility of the body, its necessary dependence on an outside, its liability to collapse into the outside (this is what death implies), to the perilous division of the body’s inside and its outside.” (Grosz 1994: 193) From the point of view of disgust and fear, one might devise a hierarchy of those abject stimuli, with tears, sweat and saliva on one extreme and excrement and urine on the other. Yet these hierarchies can easily be overthrown: the romantic lover kissing tears of her
face and the masochist lover eating excrement or drinking urine in de Sade’s world both aim at intimacy. Purity of the substance is not the point: Kristeva is right when she writes that “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect order, position, rules. The in-bewteen, the ambiguous, the composite.” (Kristeva 1982: 4).

While ontologically limited to the material and occupying the lowest stratum in the cultural hierarchy, the abject Third reaches also into the metaphysical and eschatological. The vulnerability of bodily boundaries, the easiness with which the refuse undergoes the temporal conversion from alive to dead, while still retaining a material link with the its origin, the subject’s flesh, constitute a permanent reminder of the subject’s own temporality: of the Heideggerian being-towards-death. Kristeva stresses this eschatological aspect of the abject: “These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. Such waste drops so that I might live, until from loss to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit – cadere, cadaver. (Kristeva 1982: 3). Even though from the organic point of view this might be seen as simplification because there is a continual reproduction of the refuse, eschatologically the abject Third remains a material embodiment of finality and thus a cause of anxiety, Angst, in the face of the ultimate.

In/ter-ject

In/terjection as a mode of emergence of the Third of the body is more heterogeneous than the previous fields of its operation and, as the the title of this section suggests, involves both the surface of the body and its indepth constitution. In this section, I will focus on the amalgamation of the organic and the inorganic (or alien), especially the technological, consisting either in an invasive integration of the other with the body’s structure (metaphorically: in-jection), or their surface merger (in-jec tion). Both types, although in a different measure, raise ontological questions of liminality and hybridity. I will illustrate the first type with the increasingly notorious

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2 See Mary Douglas: “Any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins. […] Matter issuing from them [orifices of the body] is the marginal stuff of the most obvious kind. Spittle, blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundaries of the body. So also have bodily parings, skin, nail, hair clippings and sweat.” (Douglas 2002: 150)
and hybridity. I will illustrate the first type with the increasingly notorious issue of the implant, and the latter with parergon and interface.

**Third as Parergon**

Beyond the soma, in cultural terms, the body may be seen and is now seen as text. The textuality of the body makes it legitimate to view its surface limit as a parergon, the concept made available to contemporary theory by Jacques Derrida in The Truth in Painting, where he uses it with reference to the textuality of works of art. With respect to the body, the “parergonization” of its surface is an effect of intrusion, either the subject’s own or imposed by the socio-cultural context, or both. Ranjana Knanna, while commenting on Derrida’s comment on the concept of beauty in Kant (“neither the finality nor the end, neither the lacking goal nor the lack of a goal, but the edging in sans of the pure cut,” Derrida 1987: 89) places emphasis on radical intervention: “The aesthetics of the parergon is especially concerned with this cut or interruption…” (Khanna 2003: 18) This applies equally well to the text/ure of the body, in which case, the “cut” consists in an incorporation into its surface of the other, which now, with the moment of incorporation, ceases being the other but, not fully being the body itself, it becomes the body’s Third. The visibility of the parergon is the effect of this Third.

While parergon is frequently perceived in terms of threat or danger to the border (it carries “implications of threatened borders, their antinomies, and the opening up of oneself to potential risk and damage by the supplement or trace threatening the border” or “damage caused by the supplement” (Khanna 2003: 16, 17)), it is not so necessarily in the case of the body. Despite the metaphorical “cut,” the mechanism of intervention need not be violent, and even if it is, it may at the same time involve a welcome incorporation of the Third into the body’s surface for the sake of expounding its texturality.

Many of the practices of parergonization of the body have been known since remote times (and in cultures remote to the West), but it is only in the context of postmodernity that these interventions have become discursively identifiable as forms of negotiation of the body and its other, and as undermining the limits of both flesh and self. The practices of the production of the parergon Third are multifarious: from mild alterations of the body’s shape and appearance, like clothing and various types of attire, through hair style and make-up, to invasive ones, like tattooing, piercing, scarification and incorporation into the body of (now no longer) alien object. What they all have in
common is the alteration of the biological flesh by what does not somatically belong to it, but which, once incorporated into/onto the parergon, can no longer be said to remain in the sphere of the other, event though it is not yet the body itself.

The parergon Third of the body may be seen as an effect of two operations. On the one hand, it is seen, especially by feminist critics, as a an effect of social and cultural inscription, either tacitly accepted or even welcome, or nonviolently imposed by the normative practices of power. Foregrounding this stance, Elizabeth Grosz writes:

Makeup, stilletos, bras, hair sprays, clothing, underclothing mark women’s bodies, whether black or white, in ways in which hair styles, professional training, personal grooming, gait, posture, body building, and sports mark men’s. There is nothing natural or ahistorical about these modes of corporeal inscription. Through them, bodies are made amenable to the prevailing exigencies of power. They make the flesh into a particular type of body. (Grosz 1994: 142)

On this view, the parergon Third subverts not only bodily boundaries, but also those between biology and culture. The consequence of this stance is that there are no “pure,” natural bodies without the parergon Third; just like the abject Third so the Third of the parergon is an inevitable and inescapable product of the operation of culture: “There is no ‘natural’ norm; there are only cultural forms of body, which do or do not conform to social norms.”3 (Grosz 1994: 143).

The question of conformity (or the lack of it) to social norms is also in the center of attention of the other stance which, rather than emphasizing cultural and social “disciplining” of the body, focuses on the individual’s (or group’s) conscious or semi-conscious effort at the formation of the self through alterations of the body’s texture. What is at stake here is on the one hand an attainment or formulation of individual identity, and, on the other hand, a reinforcement of that identity through resistance to social norms in general and to the dominant models of the body in particular. As Marzena Kubisz claims in Strategies of Resistance, “corporeal modifications, both canonical and oppositional, have become for the post-modern subject a strategy of identification.” (Kubisz 2003: 11) For Kubisz, the “canonical” modifications, such as body adornment or cosmetic surgery, are not so much symptoms of patriarchal oppression, but rather in-

3 An illustrative example, vividly relating South American and Western cultures, is given by Katherine Frank: “Terence Turner discusses the Kayapo of the Amazon, who exhibit an elaborate code of bodily adornment despite the fact that they do not wear clothing (lip plugs, penis sheaths, beads, body painting, plucked eyebrows, head shaving, etc.) and writes: “the apparently naked savage is as fully covered in a fabric of cultural meaning as the most elaborately draped Victorian lady or gentleman.” (Frank 2005: 107; quoting Turner 1980:115)
individual modes of identity search or re-confirmation. In this sense, she follows Kathy Davis, who claims that “Cosmetic surgery is an intervention in identity […]. [B]y providing a woman with a different starting point, cosmetic surgery can open up the possibility to renegotiate her relationship to her body and construct a different sense of self.” (Davis 1995: 113; quoted in Kubisz 2003: 25)

The parergon Third, as the product of such practices, while still remaining between the body and its other, paradoxically becomes an integrating factor for the body it/self. On a larger scale, such practices, if adopted by a community, may become strategies for group identification, as in the case of the so-called Modern Primitives (Kubisz 2003: 41-49), a community led by Fakir Mustafar, who by means of a variety of body modification techniques aimed at “a sense of stability on the individual and collective level.” (Kubisz 2003: 44) The Third thus becomes a shared experience of the individuals making up the group, the parergonization of the body being a technology of the construction of identity in both individual and communal dimension. However, as Kubisz observes, body modifications – or, we may add, the parergonization of the body in general – may become also a form of resistance against the dominant models of the body, norms of consumption, and their de-individualizing effects: “there is a deep sense of the possibility of exerting control over external and internal reality through the body,” this control emerging on the social level as a form of resistance. (Kubisz 2003: 48)

Paradoxically then, while the Third of the parergon denies the body a fixity and a stability of its boundaries, it at the same time may become an integrative factor on both on both individual and communal level; on the other hand, if effected from the external position of power, it may be a form of disciplining the self into canonical modes of behaviour.

**Implant**

In a limited way the collapse between the organic and inorganic, epitomized by the implant, has already been anticipated through the parergonization of the body. Fortunately, perhaps, we have not yet reached the stage already hailed, as Scott Bukatman demonstrates, in the discourse of cyberpunk, science fiction and the related cultural discourse, of “the postmodern crisis of a body that remains central to the operations of advanced capitalism as a sign, while it has become entirely superfluous as an object” (Bu-
katman 1993: 16), that is, a body whose “reality is that of refuse expelled as surplus-matter no longer necessary for the autonomous functioning of the technoscope” (Kroker and Kroker : 21, quoted in Bukatman 1993: 16). Still, the intrusion of inorganic and technological matter into the body has qualitatively changed the body’s ontology and has imploded the boundaries of the body from the inside. If, due to the intermingling of the body with technology and the ensuing cyborgization of the body, there is “a crisis around untenable definitions of the human,” as Bukatman claims (Bukatman 1993: 5), it certainly cannot be solved within the framework of the binary opposition body/Other and the related dichotomies. The ontology of the trans/human of necessity involves the Third.

An implant is the most obvious form of penetration of the alien matter into the human body leading to a fusion of the technological and the organic, the Third. By “implant,” as an umbrella term, I mean here all sorts of prostheses, technological devices like pacemakers, “proper” implants, artificial replacements, transplanted organs, and the like. Known since ancient times, they become more and more part of the human cyborg. We read about endoprostheses, that is prostheses implanted into child’s part of the body, which “grow” with it, as the body grows. (Pochrzest 2006). Even though the growth is mechanical (i.e., stimulated by a mini-engine within the prosthesis) and not organic, and even though such endoprostheses are still rare, a further step towards the cyborgization of the body has been made. This step has been surpassed by the neuroprostheses and electronic implants, a recent example (from June 2004) being the so-called “Brain Gate,” enabling the patient not only to operate mechanical devices by moving – purely by means of brain effort otherwise called thinking – the cursor on the screen of a computer attached to home appliances, but also to move a neuroprosthesis (an artificial arm). Biomimetics and bionics continue work on synthetic muscles and prostheses operated by the brain via nervous impulses. Bionanotechnology’s explorations concentrate on neuroimplants, which will make possible not only the reception of stimuli from the brain, but also their transmission in the opposite direction. And even though we may have to wait for applicable results of such research for another couple of decades, the progress of cyborgization and hybridization of the body – already an undeniable fact –is inevitable.

In the process of the incorporation of material otherness, the latter undergoes both an ontological and an epistemological alteration – not (or at least not yet) an or-
ganic part of the body but at the same time merged with it and assimilated, it becomes its Third, inseparable from the totality of bodily functions and from body image. The almost (but not quite) futuristic examples given above, and the prognoses of the new sciences leave no doubt that the Third of the body will grow, all the more so that the future of technology seems to foreshadow an enormous possibility of its expansion.

**Interface**

The modality of the interface as Third differs qualitatively from that of parergon and body image. While parergon relies on an organic-inorganic, and the body image on a somatic-percepteptual transgression of the body’s organic boundaries, the interface, in addition, transgresses its character as the Third of the body and, unlike those discussed so far, becomes also the Third of the mind; it attaches the subject to new spaces: virtual, social, informational, etc. Of course, to some extent all instances of the Third link the body with cultural space via their significative and semiotic function; the interface as Third, however, becomes body’s extension into imaginary or real (social, informational) spaces.

The interface now becomes a metaphorical parergon fusing the organic with the technological, to which Scott Bukatman refers as to an „interface between human subject and terminal space” (Bukatman 1993: 18). The effectiveness of such an interface relies on the opening of bodily boundaries to the technological other, which gives rise to “pervasive notions that such boundaries, if they exists at all, are almost infinitely malleable. The blurred interface between human and electronic technology is perhaps the trope that most effectively defines the concerns of postmodern culture.” (Bukatman 1993: 192) The result of such an interface on the human side is the creation of a qualitatively new type of subject which Bukatmann calls “terminal identity.” He construes terminal identity in both senses implied by the adjective: “Terminal identity: an unmistakably doubled articulation in which we find both the end of the subject and a new subjectivity constructed at the computer atation or television screen.” (Bukatman 1993: 9). Even though terminal identity is a metaphorical concept, “a form of speech” (Bukatman 1993: 22), it also is “a potentially subversive reconception of the subject that situates the human and the technological as coextensive, codependent, and mutually defining.”
What emerges from such a hybrid co-dependence is a transgression beyond the dichotomy of the body and its other into the realm of the Third.

The most evident instance of interface as Third, is the so-called virtual reality. Bukatman aptly summarises its impact on both our conceptual apparatus and the body itself: “Such ontological and epistemological issues as the nature of the human, the real, experience, sensation, cognition, identity, and gender are all placed, if not under erasure, then certainly in question around the discursive object of virtual reality and the postulated existence of perfect, simulated environments. Virtual reality has become the very embodiment of postmodern disembodiment.” (Bukatman 1993: 188) Combined with sensors communicating with the computer, the helmet responding to movements, gloves cooperating with hands in transmitting the electric stimuli, the body parts involved in the technological part of the process become an interface between the physical space and the virtual space in which the phenomenal body of the participant, as Bukatman calls it following Merleau-Ponty, immerses into the virtual space. It is the inseparability of the corporeal and the technological – the body’s Third – that constitutes the interface enabling the immersion into virtuality.

In a less effective but similar way the body links with the technological in the mind’s drive to connect to the cyberspace of the world wide web. The visible and the tactile – computer screen and keyboard – become body’s extensions facilitating access to spaces otherwise beyond the subject’s reach. This however, is not yet the point; in this sense computer could still be considered as an easily dispensable tool. With the moment, however, when the cyberspace becomes an extension of the mental space, when one begins to “think” cyberspace, the tool changes into an interface; and it is not the quantitative intensity, but qualitative change that is the cause of transformation (although certainly there is a relation between the two) For the post-industrial, technological individual (or more generally, for the postmodern subject) life without cyberspace would be an amputated life – an imprisonment in the space of the real. The tactile-visual merger with the keyboard and the screen, albeit temporary, produces the body’s Third which becomes a portal linking that real with the cyber-imaginary.

This is true especially true in the case of games, which epitomize the interfacing of the bodily and the digital and “represent the most complete symbiosis generally available between human and computer – a fusion of spaces, goals, options, and perspectives.” (Bukatman 1993: 196-197). It is so because, as Bukatman continues,
“through a play a kinetic interaction is establishes between subject and object: the per-
ceiving body becomes a phenomenal body.’” (Bukatman 1993: 199) This kind of imagi-
nary corporeal extension occurs especially in the case of the first person mode, when by 
means of body-machine interface, “the character is inserted into the cybernetic field, 
transforming perception into subject mobility.”(Bukatman 1993: 201) Like in the case of 
virtual reality, the interfacial Third of the body grants the subject new spacial modes 
and, in addition, new modes of imaginary subjectivity.

A similar case of the transmutation of the tool into the Third of the body is the 
cellular phone. As we learn from sociological insights, the social space provided by 
cellular phone has to a large extent become a substitute of the social space provided by 
common playground (Staszewski 2007) or a café. While the stationary phone tends to 
be seen and used as a separate and independent technological device, the portability of 
the cellular phone changes its ontology in relation to the human body. With numerous 
subjects, especially from younger generations, cellular phone undergoes a transforma-
tion from an interface to a semi-implant – a prosthesis personalized according to indi-
vidual needs (screen, ring, music etc.). To some of youngsters, as evidenced by a ques-
tionnaire, “mobile is more important than underwear” (Staszewski 2007: 37); others 
consider the phone as part of their (corporeal) self: “when I don’t have my mobile with 
me, I feel as if a part of me were missing” (Staszewski 2007: 37). Again, while not bio-
logically inherent in the body, the mobile – with the growing population of individuals – 
cannot be separated from it; as body’s Third, it opens up interactive spaces inevitable 
for the subject’s existence.

While all these “appliances” differ with respect to their operation and application, 
they all at the same time constitute extensions of the body facilitating access to a 
variety of spacial realms: from the phenomal space of virtual reality to the social space 
of the mobile network community. In the sense in which interface is the Third of the 
body, it has become, to quote Bukatman again, “a significantly ambiguous boundary 
between human and technology. The interface relocates the human, in fact redefines the 
human as part of the cybernetic system of information circulation and managament.” 
(Bukatman 1993: 192). The proclamation, made by Bruce Mazlish in 1972, that the dis-
continuity between man and machine is now gone, can hardly be questioned; what pro-
vides the continuity is the realm of the body’s Third.
Conclusion

The Third of the body, thus, is not the other in its haecceity as otherness; it is the other invested with the same, inevitably carrying the trace of the same. As such, the Third of the body emerges as a heterogeneous phenomenon (rather than a category), involving perceptual processes, self-apprehension, self-cognition, and corporeal relations with the (more or less) material other. Despite this heterogeneity, all manifestations of the body’s Third share one tendency – the movement towards the collapse of the clear-cut boundary between the body and the other and a formation in its place of a new realm. This collapse and formation are visible – and can be explained – from the perspective of the lived body and its lived experience. From the position of traditional ontology⁴, however, they can hardly be accounted for: its apparatus is not adequate to embrace the tertium. A solution might be an ontology based not on concepts of totality and wholeness, but an ontology assuming heterogeneity as its founding principle: for example the Deleuzian theory of the permanent flow of intensities. This, however, requires a separate discussion.

⁴ Well epitomized in the words of its great predecessor and master: “what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. For thus we define whole – that from which nothing is wanting, as a whole man or a whole box. What is true of each particular is true of the whole as such – the whole is that of which nothing is outside.” (Aristotle 1970: 207a).
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