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Cultural Action and Conscientization

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*In this article, Part II of **Cultural Action for Freedom**, Paulo Freire explains the process of conscientization as an intrinsic part of cultural action for freedom. He rejects the mechanistic and behaviorist understanding of consciousness as a passive copy of reality. Instead, he proposes the critical dimension of consciousness that recognizes human beings as active agents who transform their world. He makes specific reference to the political and social situation in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, discussing the need for cultural action in order to break the existing "culture of silence."*

Existence *in* and *with* the World

It is appropriate at this point to make an explicit and systematic analysis of the concept of conscientization.¹

The starting point for such an analysis must be a critical comprehension of man as a being who exists *in* and *with* the world. Since the basic condition for conscientization is that its agent must be a subject (that is, a conscious being), conscientization, like education, is specifically and exclusively a human process. It is as conscious beings that men are not only *in* the world, but *with* the world, together with other men. Only men, as "open" beings, are able to achieve the complex operation of simultaneously transforming the world by their action and grasping and expressing the world's reality in their creative language.

Men can fulfill the necessary condition of being *with* the world because they are able to gain objective distance from it.

Without this objectification, whereby man also objectifies himself, man would be limited to being *in* the world, lacking both self-knowledge and knowledge of the world.

Unlike men, animals are simply *in* the world, incapable of objectifying either themselves or the world. They live a life without time, properly speaking, submerged in life with no possibility of emerging from it, adjusted and adhering to reality. Men, on the contrary, who can sever this adherence and transcend mere being in the world, add to the life that they have the existence that they make. To exist is thus a mode of life that is proper to the being who is capable of transforming, of producing, of deciding, of creating, and of communicating himself.

Whereas the being that merely lives is not capable of reflecting upon itself and knowing itself living *in* the world, the existent subject reflects upon his life within the very domain of existence, and questions his relationship to the world. His domain of existence is the domain of work, of history, of culture, of values — the domain in which men experience the dialectic between determinism and freedom.

If they did not sever their adherence to the world and emerge from it as consciousness constituted in the “admiration” of the world as its object, men would be merely determinate beings, and it would be impossible to think in terms of their liberation. Only beings who can reflect upon the fact that they are determined are capable of freeing themselves. Their reflectiveness results not just in a vague and uncommitted awareness, but in the exercise of a profoundly transforming action upon the determining reality. *Consciousness of* and *action upon* reality are, therefore, inseparable constituents of the transforming act by which men become beings of relation.² By their characteristic reflection, intentionality, temporality, and transcendence,³ men’s consciousness and action are distinct from the mere *contacts* of animals with the world. The animals’ contacts are a-critical; they do not go beyond the association of sensory images through experience. They are singular and not plural. Animals do not elaborate goals; they exist at the level of immersion and are thus a-temporal.

Engagement and objective distance, understanding reality as object, understanding the significance of men’s action upon ob-

jective reality, creative communication about the object by means of language, plurality of responses to a single challenge — these varied dimensions testify to the existence of critical reflection in men’s relationships with the world. Consciousness is constituted in the dialectic of man’s objectification of and action upon the world. However, consciousness is never a mere reflection of, but a reflection upon, material reality.⁴

If it is true that consciousness is impossible without the world that constitutes it, it is equally true that this world is impossible if the world itself in constituting consciousness does not become an object of its critical reflection. Thus, mechanistic objectivism is incapable of explaining men and the world since it negates men, as is solipsistic idealism since it negates the world.

For mechanistic objectivism, consciousness is merely a “copy” of objective reality. For solipsism, the world is reduced to a capricious creation of consciousness. In the first case, consciousness would be unable to transcend its conditioning by reality; in the second, insofar as it “creates” reality, it is a priori to reality. In either case man is not engaged in transforming reality. That would be impossible in objectivistic terms, because for objectivism, consciousness, the replica or “copy” of reality, is the object of reality, and reality would then be transformed by itself.⁵ The solipsistic view is equally incompatible with the concept of transforming reality, since the transformation of an imaginary reality is an absurdity. Thus in both conceptions of consciousness there can be no true praxis. Praxis is only possible where the objective-subjective dialectic is maintained.⁶

Behaviorism also fails to comprehend the dialectic of man-world relationships. Under the form called mechanistic behaviorism, men are negated because they are seen as machines. The second form, logical behaviorism, also negates men, since it affirms that men’s consciousness is “merely an abstraction.”⁷ The process of conscientization cannot be founded upon any of these defective explanations of man-world relationships. Conscientization is viable only because men’s consciousness, although conditioned, can recognize that it is conditioned. This “critical” dimension of consciousness accounts for the goals men assign to their transforming acts upon the world. Because they

are able to have goals, men alone are capable of entertaining the result of their action even before initiating the proposed action. They are beings who project:

We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of the bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.⁸

Although bees, as expert "specialists," can identify the flower they need for making their honey, they do not vary their specialization. They cannot produce by-products. Their action upon the world is not accompanied by objectification; it lacks the critical reflection that characterizes men's tasks. Whereas animals adapt themselves to the world to survive, men modify the world in order *to be more*. In adapting themselves for the sake of survival, without ends to achieve and choices to make, animals cannot "animalize" the world. "Animalization" of the world would be intimately linked to the "animalization" of animals, and this would presuppose in animals an awareness that they are incomplete, which would engage them in a permanent quest. In fact, however, while they skillfully construct their hives and "manufacture" honey, bees remain bees in their contact with the world; they do not become more or less bees.⁹

For men, as beings of praxis, to transform the world is to humanize it, even if making the world human may not yet signify the humanization of men. It may simply mean impregnating the world with man's curious and inventive presence, imprinting it with the trace of his works. The process of transforming the world, which reveals this presence of man, can lead to his humanization as well as his dehumanization, to his growth or diminution. These alternatives reveal to man his problematic nature and pose a problem for him, requiring that he choose one path or the other. Often this very process of transformation ensnares man and his freedom to choose. Nevertheless, because they impregnate the world with their reflective presence, only men can humanize or dehumanize. Humanization is their

utopia, which they announce in denouncing dehumanizing processes.

The reflectiveness and finality of men's relationships with the world would not be possible if these relationships did not occur in a historical as well as physical context. Without critical reflection there is no finality, nor does finality have meaning outside an uninterrupted temporal series of events. For men there is no *here* relative to a *there* that is not connected to a *now*, a *before*, and an *after*. Thus men's relationships with the world are per se historical, as are men themselves. Not only do men make the history that makes them, but they also can recount the history of this mutual making. In becoming "hominized"¹⁰ in the process of evolution, men become capable of having a biography. Animals, on the contrary, are immersed in a time that belongs not to them, but to men.

There is a further fundamental distinction between man's relationships with the world and the animal's contacts with it: only men work. A horse, for example, lacks what is proper to man, what Marx refers to in his example of the bees: "At the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement."¹¹ Action without this dimension is not work. In the fields as well as in the circus, the apparent work of horses reflects the work of men. Action is work not because of the greater or lesser physical effort expended in it by the acting organism, but because of the consciousness the subject has of his own effort, his possibility of programming action, for creating tools and using them to mediate between himself and the object of his action, of having purposes, of anticipating results. Still more, for action to work, it must result in significant products, which while distinct from the active agent, at the same time condition him and become the object of his reflection.¹² As men act upon the world effectively, transforming it by their work, their consciousness is in turn historically and culturally conditioned through the "inversion of praxis." According to the quality of this conditioning, men's consciousness attains various levels in the context of cultural-historical reality. We propose to analyze these levels of consciousness as a further step toward understanding the process of conscientization.

Historical Conditioning and Levels of Consciousness

To understand the levels of consciousness, we must understand cultural-historical reality as a superstructure in relation to an infrastructure. Therefore, we will try to discern, in relative rather than absolute terms, the fundamental characteristics of the historical-cultural configuration to which such levels correspond.

Our intention is not to attempt a study of the origins and historical evolution of consciousness, but to make a concrete introductory analysis of the levels of consciousness in Latin American reality. This does not invalidate such an analysis for other areas of the Third World, nor for those areas in the metropolises that identify themselves with the Third World as "areas of silence."

We will first study the historical-cultural configuration that we have called "the culture of silence." This mode of culture is a superstructural expression that conditions a special form of consciousness. The culture of silence "overdetermines" the infrastructure in which it originates.¹³

Understanding the culture of silence is possible only if it is taken as a totality that is itself part of a greater whole. In this greater whole we must also recognize the culture or cultures that determine the voice of the culture of silence. We do not mean that the culture of silence is an entity created by the metropolis in specialized laboratories and transported to the Third World. Nor is it true, however, that the culture of silence emerges by spontaneous generation. The fact is that the culture of silence is born in the relationship between the Third World and the metropolis. "It is not the dominator who constructs a culture and imposes it on the dominated. This culture is the result of the structural relations between the dominated and the dominators."¹⁴ Thus, understanding the culture of silence presupposes an analysis of dependence as a relational phenomenon that gives rise to different forms of being, of thinking, of expression, those of the culture of silence and those of the culture that "has a voice."

We must avoid both of the positions previously criticized in this article: objectivism, which leads to mechanism; and idealism, which leads to solipsism. Further, we must guard against idealizing the superstructure, dichotomizing it from the infrastructure. If we underestimate either the superstructure or infrastructure it will

be impossible to explain the social structure itself. Social structure is not an abstraction; it exists in the dialectic between super- and infrastructures. Failing to understand this dialectic, we will not understand the dialectic of change and permanence as the expression of the social structure.

It is true that the infrastructure, created in the relations by which the work of man transforms the world, gives rise to superstructure. But it is also true that the latter, mediated by men, who introject its myths, turns upon the infrastructure and "overdetermines" it. If it were not for the dynamic of these precarious relationships in which men exist and work in the world, we could speak neither of social structure, nor of men, nor of a human world.

Let us return to the relationship between the metropolitan society and the dependent society as the source of their respective ways of being, thinking, and expression. Both the metropolitan society and the dependent society, totalities in themselves, are part of a greater whole, the economic, historical, cultural, and political context in which their mutual relationships evolve. Though the contest in which these societies relate to each other is the same, the quality of the relationship is obviously different in each case, being determined by the role that each plays in the total context of their interrelation. The action of the metropolitan society upon the dependent society has a directive character, whereas the object society's action, whether it be response or initiative, has a dependent character.

The relationships between the dominator and the dominated reflect the greater social context, even when formally personal. Such relationships imply the introjection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator. Similarly, the dependent society introjects the values and lifestyle of the metropolitan society, since the structure of the latter shapes that of the former. This results in the duality of the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of its long experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society.

The infrastructure of the dependent society is shaped by the director society's will. The resultant superstructure, therefore, re-

flects the inauthenticity of the infrastructure. Whereas the metropolis can absorb its ideological crises through mechanisms of economic power and a highly developed technology, the dependent structure is too weak to support the slightest popular manifestation. This accounts for the frequent rigidity of the dependent structure.

The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the voice of the metropolis — in every way, the metropolis speaks, the dependent society listens.¹⁵

The silence of the object society in relation to the director society is repeated in the relationships within the object society itself. Its power elites, silent in the face of the metropolis, silence their own people in turn. Only when the people of a dependent society break out of the culture of silence and win their right to speak — only, that is, when radical structural changes transform the dependent society — can such a society as a whole cease to be silent towards the director society.

On the other hand, if a group seizes power through a coup d'état, as in the recent case of Peru, and begins to take nationalist economic and cultural defense measures, its policy creates a new contradiction, with one of the following consequences. First, the new regime may exceed its own intentions and be obliged to break definitively with the culture of silence both internally and externally. Or, fearing the ascension of the people, it may retrogress, and re-impose silence on the people. Third, the government may sponsor a new type of populism. Stimulated by the first nationalist measures, the submerged masses would have the illusion that they were participating in the transformations of their society, when, in fact, they were being shrewdly manipulated. In Peru, as the military group that took power in 1968 pursues its political objectives, many of its actions will cause "cracks" to appear in the most closed areas of Peruvian society. Through these cracks, the masses will begin to emerge from their silence with increasingly demanding attitudes. Insofar as their demands are met, the masses will tend not only to increase their frequency, but also to alter their nature.

Thus, the populist approach will also end up creating serious contradictions for the power group. It will find itself obliged ei-

ther to break open the culture of silence or to restore it. That is why it seems to us difficult in Latin America's present historical moment for any government to maintain even a relatively aggressive independent policy towards the metropolis while preserving the culture of silence internally.

In 1961, Janio Quadros came to power in Brazil in what was perhaps the greatest electoral victory in the nation's history. He attempted to carry out a paradoxical policy of independence towards the metropolis and control over the people. After seven months in office, he unexpectedly announced to the nation that he was obliged to renounce the presidency under pressure from the same hidden forces that had driven President Getulio Vargas to commit suicide. And so he made a melancholy exit and headed for London.

The Brazilian military group that overthrew the Goulart government in 1964, picturesquely designating their action a revolution, have followed a coherent course according to our preceding analysis: a consistent policy of servility towards the metropolis and the violent imposition of silence upon their own people. A policy of servility towards the metropolis and rupture of the internal culture of silence would not be viable. Neither would a policy of independence towards the metropolis while maintaining the culture of silence internally.

Latin American societies were established as closed societies from the time of their conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese, when the culture of silence took shape. With the exception of post-revolutionary Cuba, these societies are still closed societies today.¹⁶ They are dependent societies for whom only the poles of decision of which they are the object have changed at different historical moments: Portugal, Spain, England, or the United States.

Latin American societies are closed societies characterized by a rigid hierarchical social structure; by the lack of internal markets, since their economy is controlled from the outside; by the exportation of raw materials and importation of manufactured goods, without a voice in either process; by a precarious and selective educational system whose schools are an instrument of maintaining the status quo; by high percentages of illiteracy and disease, including the naively named "tropical diseases" that are

really diseases of underdevelopment and dependence; by alarming rates of infant mortality; by malnutrition, often with irreparable effects on mental faculties; by a low life expectancy; and by a high rate of crime.

There is a mode of consciousness that corresponds to the concrete reality of such dependent societies. It is a consciousness historically conditioned by the social structures. The principal characteristic of this consciousness, as dependent as the society to whose structure it conforms, is its "quasi-adherence" to objective reality, or "quasi-immersion" in reality.¹⁷ The dominated consciousness does not have sufficient distance from reality to objectify it in order to know it in a critical way.¹⁸ We call this mode of consciousness "semi-intransitive."¹⁹

Semi-intransitive consciousness is typical of closed structures. In its quasi-immersion in concrete reality, this consciousness fails to perceive many of reality's challenges, or perceives them in a distorted way. Its semi-intransitiveness is a kind of obliteration imposed by objective conditions. Because of this obliteration, the only data that the dominated consciousness grasps are the data that lie within the orbit of its lived experience. This mode of consciousness cannot objectify the facts and problematical situations of daily life. Men whose consciousness exists at this level of quasi-immersion lack what we call "structural perception," which shapes and reshapes itself from concrete reality in the apprehension of facts and problematical situations. Lacking structural perception, men attribute the sources of such facts and situations in their lives either to some super-reality or to something within themselves; in either case to something outside objective reality. It is not hard to trace here the origin of the fatalistic positions men assume in certain situations. If the explanation for those situations lies in a superior power, or in men's own "natural" incapacity, it is obvious that their action will not be orientated towards transforming reality, but towards those superior beings responsible for the problematical situation, or toward that presumed incapacity. Their action, therefore, has the character of defensive magic or therapeutic magic. Thus, before harvest time or sowing, Latin American peasants, and the peasants of the Third World in general, perform magical rites, often of a syncretistic religious nature. Even when those rites evolve into

cultural traditions, they remain instrumental for a time; the transformation of a magical rite into an expression of tradition does not happen suddenly. It is a process involving, once again, the dialectic between objectivity and subjectivity.²⁰

Under the impact of infrastructural changes that produced the first "cracks" in Latin American societies, they entered the present stage of historical and cultural transition — some more intensely than others. In the particular case of Brazil, this process began with the abolition of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century.²¹ It accelerated during World War I and again after the depression of 1929, intensified during World War II, and continued with fits and starts to 1964, when the military coup violently returned the nation to silence.

What is important, nevertheless, is that once the cracks in the structure begin to appear, and once societies enter the period of transition, immediately the first movements of emergence of the hitherto submerged and silent masses begin to manifest themselves. This does not mean, however, that movements towards emergence automatically break open the culture of silence. In their relationship to the metropolis, transitional societies continue to be silent totalities. Within them, however, the phenomenon of the emerging masses forces the power elites to experiment with new forms of maintaining the masses in silence, since structural changes that provoke the emergence of the masses also qualitatively alter their quasi-immersed and semi-intransitive consciousness.

The objective datum of a closed society, one of its structural components, is the silence of the masses, a silence broken only by occasional, ineffective rebellions. When this silence coincides with the masses' fatalistic perception of reality, the power elites that impose silence on the masses are rarely questioned.²² When the closed society begins to crack, however, the new datum becomes the demanding presence of the masses. Silence is no longer seen as an inalterable given, but as the result of a reality that can and must be transformed. This historical transition, lived by Latin American societies to a greater or lesser degree, corresponds to a new phase of popular consciousness, that of "naive transitivity." Formerly the popular consciousness was semi-intransitive, limited to meeting the challenges relative to biologi-

cal needs. In the process of emerging from silence, the capacity of the popular consciousness expands so that men begin to be able to visualize and distinguish what before was not clearly outlined.

Although the qualitative difference between the semi-intransitive consciousness and the naive transitive consciousness can be explained by the phenomenon of emergence due to structural transformations in society, there are no rigidly defined frontiers between the historical moments that produce qualitative changes in men's awareness. In many respects, the semi-intransitive consciousness remains present in the naive transitive consciousness. In Latin America, for example, almost the entire peasant population is still in the stage of quasi-immersion, a stage with a much longer history than the present one of emergence. The semi-intransitive peasant consciousness introjected innumerable myths in the former stage that continue despite a change in awareness towards transitivity. Therefore, the transitive consciousness emerges as a naive consciousness, as dominated as the former. Nevertheless, it is now indisputably more disposed to perceiving the source of its ambiguous existence in the objective conditions of society.

The emergence of the popular consciousness implies, if not the overcoming of the culture of silence, at least the presence of the masses in the historical process applying pressure on the power elite. It can only be understood as one dimension of a more complex phenomenon. That is to say, the emergence of the popular consciousness, although yet naively intransitive, is also a moment in the developing consciousness of the power elite. In a structure of domination, the silence of the popular masses would not exist but for the power elites who silence them; nor would there be a power elite without the masses. Just as there is a moment of surprise among the masses when they begin to see what they did not see before, there is a corresponding surprise among the elites in power when they find themselves unmasked by the masses. This two-fold unveiling provokes anxieties in both the masses and the power elites. The masses become anxious for freedom, anxious to overcome the silence in which they have always existed. The elites are anxious to maintain the status

quo by allowing only superficial transformations designed to prevent any real change in their power of prescription.

In the transitional process, the predominantly static character of the "closed society" gradually yields to a dynamism in all dimensions of social life. Contradictions come to the surface, provoking conflicts in which the popular consciousness becomes more and more demanding, causing greater and greater alarm on the part of the elites. As the lines of this historical transition become more sharply etched, illuminating the contradictions inherent in a dependent society, groups of intellectuals and students, who themselves belong to the privileged elite, seek to become engaged in social reality, tending to reject imported schemes and pre-fabricated solutions. The arts gradually cease to be the mere expression of the easy life of the affluent bourgeoisie, and begin to find their inspiration in the hard life of the people. Poets begin to write about more than their lost loves, and even the theme of lost love becomes less maudlin, more objective and lyrical. They speak now of the field hand and laborer not as abstract and metaphysical concepts, but as concrete men with concrete lives.²³

In the case of Brazil, such qualitative changes marked all levels of creative life. As the transitional phase intensified, these active groups focused more and more on their national reality in order to know it better and to create ways of overcoming their society's state of dependence.

The transitional phase also generates a new style of political life, since the old political models of the closed society are no longer adequate where the masses are an emerging historical presence. In the closed society, relations between the elite and the quasi-immersed people are mediated by political bosses, representing the various elitist factions. In Brazil, the invariably paternalistic political bosses are owners not only of their lands, but also of the silent and obedient popular masses under their control. As rural areas in Latin America at first were not touched by the emergence provoked by the cracks in society, they remained predominantly under the control of the political bosses.²⁴ In urban centers, by contrast, a new kind of leadership emerged to mediate between the power elites and the emerging masses: the

populist leadership. There is one characteristic of populist leadership that deserves our particular attention: we refer to its manipulative character.

Although the emergence of the masses from silence does not allow the political style of the formerly closed society to continue, that does not mean that the masses are able to speak on their own behalf. They have merely passed from quasi-immersion to a naive transitive state of awareness. Populist leadership thus could be said to be an adequate response to the new presence of the masses in the historical process. But it is a manipulative leadership — manipulative of the masses, since it cannot manipulate the elite.

Populist manipulation of the masses must be seen from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it is undeniably a kind of political opiate that maintains not only the naiveté of the emerging consciousness, but also the people's habit of being directed. On the other hand, to the extent that it uses mass protest and demands, political manipulation paradoxically accelerates the process by which the people unveil reality. This paradox sums up the ambiguous character of populism: it is manipulative, yet at the same time a factor in democratic mobilization.²⁵

Thus, the new style of political life found in transitional societies is not confined to the manipulative role of its leaders, mediating between the masses and the elites. Indeed, the populist style of political action ends up creating conditions for youth groups and intellectuals to exercise political participation together with the people. Although it is an instance of manipulative paternalism, populism offers the possibility of a critical analysis of the manipulation itself. Within the whole play of contradictions and ambiguities, the emergence of the popular masses in transitional societies prepares the way for the masses to become conscious of their dependent state.

As we have said, the passage of the masses from a semi-intransitive to a naive transitive state of consciousness is also the moment of an awakening consciousness on the part of the elites, a decisive moment for the critical consciousness of progressive groups. At first there appears a fragile awareness among small groups of intellectuals who are still marked by the cultural alienation of society as a whole, an alienation reinforced by their uni-

versity "formation." As the contradictions typical of a society in transition emerge more clearly, these groups multiply and are able to distinguish more and more precisely what makes up their society. They tend more and more to join with the popular masses in a variety of ways: through literature, plastic arts, the theater, music, education, sports, and folk art. What is important is the communion with the people that some of these groups are able to achieve.

At this point the increasingly critical consciousness of these progressive groups, arising from the naive transitivity of the emerging masses, becomes a challenge to the consciousness of the power elites. Societies that find themselves in this historical phase, which cannot be clearly understood outside the critical comprehension of the totality of which they are a part, live in a climate of pre-revolution whose dialectical contradiction is the coup d'état.

In Latin America, the coup d'état has become the answer of the economic and military power elites to the crises of popular emergence. This response varies with the relative influence of the military. According to the degree of its violence and that of the subsequent repression of the people, the coup d'état "reactivates" old patterns of behavior in the people, patterns that belong to their former state of quasi-immersion. Only this "reaction" of the culture of silence can explain the passivity of the people when faced with the violence and arbitrary rule of Latin American military coups (with the sole exception, up to now, of Peru).²⁶

It must be emphasized that the coups d'état in Latin America are incomprehensible without a dialectical vision of reality; any attempt to understand them mechanistically will lead to a distorted picture. Intensely problematical, unmasking more and more their condition of dependency, Latin American societies in transition are confronted with two contradictory possibilities: revolution or coup d'état. The stronger the ideological foundations of a coup d'état, the more it is impossible for a society to return afterwards to the same political style that created the very conditions for the coup. A coup d'état qualitatively alters the process of a society's historical transition and marks the beginning of a new transition. In the original transitional stage, the

coup was the antithetical alternative to revolution; in the new transitional stage, the coup is defined and confirmed as an arbitrary and anti-popular power, whose tendency before the continuing possibility of revolution is to become more and more rigid.

In Brazil, the transition marked by the coup d'état sets up recapitulation to an ideology of development based on the handing over of the national economy to foreign interests, an ideology in which "the idea of the great international enterprise replaces the idea of the state monopoly as the basis for development."²⁷ One of the basic requirements for such an ideology is necessarily the silencing of popular sectors and their consequent removal from the sphere of decisionmaking. Popular forces must, therefore, avoid the naive illusion that this transitional stage may afford "openings" that will enable them to re-establish the rhythm of the previous transitional stages, whose political model corresponded to a national populist ideology of development.

The "openings" that the new transitional phase offers have their own semantics. Such openings do not signify a return to what has been, but a give and take within the play of accommodations demanded by the reigning ideology. Whatever its ideology, the new transitional phase challenges the popular forces to find an entirely new way of proceeding, distinct from their action in the former period when they were contending with the forces that those coups brought to power.

One of the reasons for the change is obvious enough. Due to the repression imposed by the coup, the popular forces have to act in silence, and silent action requires a difficult apprenticeship. Further, the popular forces have to search for ways to counter the effects of the reactivation of the culture of silence, which historically engendered the dominated consciousness.

Under these conditions, what is the possibility of survival for the emerging consciousness that has reached the state of naive transitivity? The answer to this question must be found in a deeper analysis of the transitional phase inaugurated by the military coup. Since revolution is still a possibility in this phase, our analysis will focus on the dialectical confrontation between the revolutionary project (or, lamentably, projects) and the new regime.

Cultural Action and Cultural Revolution

It would be unnecessary to tell the revolutionary groups that they are the antagonistic contradiction of the Right. However, it would not be inexpedient to emphasize that this antagonism, which is born of their opposing purposes, must express itself in a behavior that is equally antagonistic. There ought to be a difference in the praxis of the Right and of revolutionary groups that defines them to the people, making the options of each group explicit. This difference between the two groups stems from the utopic nature of the revolutionary groups, and the impossibility of the Right to be utopic. This is not an arbitrary distinction, but one that is sufficient to distinguish radically the objectives and forms of action taken by the revolutionary and rightist groups.²⁸

To the extent that real utopia implies the denunciation of an unjust reality and the proclamation of a pre-project, revolutionary leadership cannot:

- a) denounce reality without knowing reality;
- b) proclaim a new reality without having a draft project which, although it emerges in the denunciation, becomes a viable project only in praxis;
- c) know reality without relying on the people as well as on objective facts for the source of its knowledge;
- d) denounce and proclaim by itself;
- e) make new myths out of the denunciation and annunciation — denunciation and annunciation must be anti-ideological insofar as they result from a scientific knowledge of reality;
- f) renounce communion with the people, not only during the time between the dialectic of denunciation and annunciation and the concretization of a viable project, but also in the very act of giving that project concrete reality.

Thus, revolutionary leadership falls into internal contradictions that compromise its purpose, when, victim of a fatalist concept of history, it tries to domesticate the people mechanically to a future that the leadership knows a priori, but which it thinks the people are incapable of knowing. In this case, revolutionary leadership ceases to be utopian and ends up identified with the

Right. The Right makes no denunciation or proclamation, except, as we have said, to denounce whoever denounces it and to proclaim its own myths.

A true revolutionary project, on the other hand, to which the utopian dimension is natural, is a process in which the people assume the role of subject in the precarious adventure of transforming and recreating the world. The Right is necessarily opposed to such a project, and attempts to immobilize it. Thus, to use Erich Fromm's terms, the revolutionary utopia is biophilic, whereas the Right in its rigidity is necrophilic, as is a revolutionary leadership that has become bureaucratic.²⁹

Revolutionary utopia tends to be dynamic rather than static; tends to life rather than death; to the future as a challenge to man's creativity rather than as a repetition of the present; to love as liberation of subjects rather than as pathological possessiveness; to the emotion of life rather than cold abstractions; to living together in harmony rather than gregariousness; to dialogue rather than mutism; to praxis rather than "law and order"; to men who organize themselves reflectively for action rather than men who are organized for passivity; to creative and communicative language rather than prescriptive signals; to reflective challenges rather than domesticating slogans; and to values that are lived rather than myths that are imposed.

The Right in its rigidity prefers the dead to the living; the static to the dynamic; the future as a repetition of the past rather than as a creative venture; pathological forms of love rather than real love; frigid schematization rather than the emotion of living; gregariousness rather than authentic living together; organization men rather than creative and communicative language; and slogans rather than challenges.

It is indispensable for revolutionaries to witness more and more the radical difference that separates them from the rightist elite. It is not enough to condemn the violence of the Right, its aristocratic posture, its myths. Revolutionaries must prove their respect for the people, their belief and confidence in them, not as a mere strategy but as an implicit requirement to being a revolutionary. This commitment to the people is fundamental at any given moment, but especially in the transition period created by a coup d'état.

Victimizing the people by its violence, the coup reimposes, as we have said, the old climate of the culture of silence. The people, standing at the threshold of their experience as subjects and participants of society, need signs that will help them recognize who is with them and who is against them. These signs, or witnesses, are given through projects proposed by men in dialectic with the structure. Each project constitutes an interacting totality of objectives, methods, procedures, and techniques. The revolutionary project is distinguished from the rightist project not only by its objectives, but by its total reality. A project's method cannot be dichotomized from its content and objectives, as if methods were neutral and equally appropriate for liberation or domination. Such a concept reveals a naive idealism that is satisfied with the subjective intention of the person who acts.

The revolutionary project is engaged in a struggle against oppressive and dehumanizing structures. To the extent that it seeks the affirmation of concrete men as men freeing themselves, any thoughtless concession to the oppressor's methods is always a danger and a threat to the revolutionary project itself. Revolutionaries must demand of themselves an imperious coherence. As men, they may make mistakes, they are subject to equivocation, but they cannot act like reactionaries and call themselves revolutionaries. They must suit their action to historical conditions, taking advantage of the real and unique possibilities that exist. Their role is to seek the most efficient and viable means of helping the people to move from the levels of semi-intransitive or naive-transitive consciousness to the level of critical consciousness. This preoccupation, which is alone authentically liberating, is implicit in the revolutionary project itself. Originating in the praxis of both the leadership and the rank and file, every revolutionary project is basically "cultural action" in the process of becoming "cultural revolution."

Revolution is a critical process, unrealizable without science and reflection. In the midst of reflective action on the world to be transformed, the people come to recognize that the world is indeed being transformed. The world in transformation is the mediator of the dialogue between the people, at one pole of the act of knowing, and the revolutionary leadership, at the other. If

objective conditions do not always permit this dialogue, its existence can be verified by the witness of the leadership.

Che Guevara is an example of the unceasing witness revolutionary leadership gives to dialogue with the people. The more we study his work, the more we perceive his conviction that anyone who wants to become a true revolutionary must be in "communion" with the people. Guevara did not hesitate to recognize the capacity to love as an indispensable condition for authentic revolutionaries. While he constantly noted the failure of the peasants to participate in the guerrilla movement, his references to them in his Bolivian diary did not express disaffection. He never lost hope of ultimately being able to count on their participation. In the same spirit of communion, Guevara's guerrilla encampment served as the "theoretical context" in which he and his companions together analyzed the concrete events they were living through and planned the strategy of their action.

Guevara did not create dichotomies between the methods, content, and objectives of his projects. In spite of the risks to his and his companions' lives, he justified guerrilla warfare as an introduction to freedom, as a call to life to those who are the living dead. Like Camilo Torres, he became a guerrilla not out of desperation, but because, as a lover of men, he dreamt of a new man being born in the experience of liberation. In this sense, Guevara incarnated the authentic revolutionary utopia as did few others. He was one of the great prophets of the silent ones of the Third World. Conversant with many of them, he spoke on behalf of all of them.

In citing Guevara and his witness as a guerrilla, we do not mean to say that revolutionaries elsewhere are obliged to repeat the same witness. What is essential is that they strive to achieve communion with the people as he did, patiently and unceasingly. Communion with the people — accessible only to those with a utopian vision, in the sense referred to in this article — is one of the fundamental characteristics of cultural action for freedom. Authentic communion implies communication between men, mediated by the world. Only praxis in the context of communion makes conscientization a viable project. Conscientization is a joint project in that it takes place in a man among other men, men

united by their action and by their reflection upon that action and upon the world. Thus men together achieve the state of perceptive clarity that Goldman calls "the maximum of potential consciousness" beyond "real consciousness."³⁰

Conscientization is more than a simple *prise de conscience*. While it implies overcoming "false consciousness," overcoming, that is, a semi-intransitive or naive transitive state of consciousness, it implies further the critical insertion of the conscientized person into a demythologized reality. This is why conscientization is an unrealizable project for the Right. The Right is by its nature incapable of being utopian, and hence it cannot develop a form of cultural action that would bring about conscientization. There can be no conscientization of the people without a radical denunciation of dehumanizing structures, accompanied by the proclamation of a new reality to be created by men. The Right cannot unmask itself, nor can it sponsor the means for the people to unmask it more than it is willing to be unmasked. With the increased clarity of the popular consciousness, its own consciousness tends to grow, but this form of conscientization cannot convert itself into a praxis leading to the conscientization of the people. There can be no conscientization without denunciation of unjust structures, a thing that cannot be expected of the Right. Nor can there be popular conscientization for domination. The Right invents new forms of cultural action only for domination.

Thus, the two forms of cultural action are antagonistic to each other. Whereas cultural action for freedom is characterized by dialogue, and its preeminent purpose is to conscientize the people, cultural action for domination is opposed to dialogue and serves to domesticate the people. The former problematizes, the latter sloganizes.³¹ Since cultural action for freedom is committed to the scientific unveiling of reality, to the exposure, that is, of myths and ideologies, it must separate ideology from science. Althusser insists on the necessity of this separation.³² Cultural action for freedom can be satisfied neither with "the mystifications of ideology," as he calls them, nor with "a simple moral denunciation of myths and errors," but must undertake a "rational and rigorous critique [of ideology]." The fundamental role of those committed to cultural action for conscientization is not properly speaking to fabri-

cate the liberating idea, but to invite the people to grasp with their minds the truth of their reality.

Consistent with this spirit of knowing, scientific knowledge cannot be knowledge that is merely transmitted, for it would itself become ideological myth, even if it were transmitted with the intention of liberating men. The discrepancy between intention and practice would be resolved in favor of practice. The only authentic points of departure for the scientific knowledge of reality are the dialectical relationships between men and the world, and the critical comprehension of how these relationships are evolved and how they in turn condition men's perception of concrete reality.

Those who use cultural action as a strategy for maintaining their domination over the people have no choice but to indoctrinate the people in a mythified version of reality. In doing so, the Right subordinates science and technology to its own ideology, using them to disseminate information and prescriptions in its effort to adjust the people to the reality that the "communications" media define as proper. By contrast, for those who undertake cultural action for freedom, science is the indispensable instrument for denouncing the myths created by the Right, and philosophy is the matrix of the proclamation of a new reality. Science and philosophy together provide the principles of action for conscientization. Cultural action for conscientization is always a utopian enterprise. That is why it needs philosophy, without which, instead of denouncing reality and announcing the future, it would fall into the "mystifications of ideological knowledge."

The utopian nature of cultural action for freedom is what distinguishes it above all from cultural action for domination. Cultural action for domination, based on myths, cannot pose problems about reality to the people, nor orientate the people to the unveiling of reality, since both of these projects would imply denunciation and annunciation. On the contrary, in problematizing and conscientizing cultural action for freedom, the annunciation of a new reality is the historical project proposed for men's achievement.

In the face of a semi-intransitive or naive state of consciousness among the people, conscientization envisages their attaining criti-

cal consciousness, or "the maximum of potential consciousness." This objective cannot terminate when the annunciation becomes concrete. On the contrary, when the annunciation becomes concrete reality, the need becomes even greater for critical consciousness among the people, both horizontally and vertically. Thus, cultural action for freedom, which characterized the movement that struggled for the realization of what was announced, must then transform itself into permanent cultural revolution.

Before going on to elaborate upon the distinct but essentially related moments of cultural action and cultural revolution, let us summarize our preceding points about levels of consciousness. An explicit relationship has been established between cultural action for freedom, conscientization as its chief enterprise, and the transcendence of semi-intransitive and naive-transitive states of consciousness by critical consciousness. Critical consciousness is brought about not through an intellectual effort alone, but through praxis — through the authentic union of action and reflection. Such reflective action cannot be denied to the people. If it were, the people would be no more than activist pawns in the hands of a leadership that reserved for itself the right of decisionmaking. The authentic left cannot fail to stimulate the overcoming of the people's false consciousness, on whatever level it exists, just as the Right is incapable of doing so. In order to maintain its power, the Right needs an elite who think for it, assisting it in accomplishing its projects. Revolutionary leadership needs the people in order to make the revolutionary project a reality, but the people in the process of becoming more and more critically conscious.

After the revolutionary reality is inaugurated, conscientization continues to be indispensable. It is the instrument for ejecting the cultural myths that remain in the people despite the new reality. Further, it is a force countering the bureaucracy, which threatens to deaden the revolutionary vision and dominate the people in the very name of their freedom.³³ Finally, conscientization is a defense against another threat, that of the potential mythification of the technology, which the new society requires to transform its backward infrastructures.³⁴

There are two possible directions open to the transitive popular consciousness. The first is growth from a naive state of con-

consciousness to the level of critical consciousness — Goldman's "maximum of potential consciousness." The second is the distortion of the transitive state of consciousness to its pathological form — that of the fanatic or "irrational" consciousness.³⁵ This form has a mythical character that replaces the magical character of the semi-intransitive and naive-transitive states of consciousness. "Massification" — the phenomenon of mass societies — originates at this level. Mass society is not to be associated with the emergence of the masses in the historical process, as an aristocratic eye may view the phenomenon. True, the emergence of the masses with their claims and demands makes them present in the historical process, however naive their consciousness — a phenomenon that accompanies the cracking up of closed societies under the impact of the first infrastructural changes. Mass society, however, occurs much later. It appears in highly technologized, complex societies. In order to function, these societies require specialties, which become specialisms, and rationality, which degenerates into myth-making irrationalism.

Distinct from specialties, to which we are not opposed, specialisms narrow the area of knowledge in such a way that the so-called "specialists" become generally incapable of thinking. Because they have lost the vision of the whole of which their "specialty" is only one dimension, they cannot even think correctly in the area of their specialization.

Similarly, the rationality basic to science and technology disappears under the extraordinary effects of technology itself, and its place is taken by myth-making irrationalism. The attempt to explain man as a superior type of robot originates in such irrationalism.³⁶

In mass society, ways of thinking become as standardized as ways of dressing and tastes in food. Men begin thinking and acting according to the prescriptions they receive daily from the communications media rather than in response to their dialectical relationships with the world. In mass societies, where everything is prefabricated and behavior is almost automatized, men are lost because they don't have to "risk themselves." They do not have to think about even the smallest things; there is always some manual that says what to do in situation "a" or "b." Rarely do men

have to pause at a street corner to think which direction to follow. There's always an arrow that deproblematizes the situation. Though street signs are not evil in themselves, and are necessary in cosmopolitan cities, they are among thousands of directional signals in a technological society that, introjected by men, hinder their capacity for critical thinking.

Technology thus ceases to be perceived by men as one of the greatest expressions of their creative power and becomes instead a species of new divinity to which they create a cult of worship. Efficiency ceases to be identified with the power men have to think, to imagine, to risk themselves in creation, and rather comes to mean carrying out orders from above precisely and punctually.³⁷

Let it be clear, however, that technological development must be one of the concerns of the revolutionary project. It would be simplistic to attribute responsibility for these deviations to technology in itself. This would be another kind of irrationalism, that of conceiving of technology as a demonic entity, above and opposed to men. Critically viewed, technology is nothing more nor less than a natural phase of the creative process that engaged man from the moment he forged his first tool and began to transform the world for its humanization.

Considering that technology is not only necessary but part of man's natural development, the question facing revolutionaries is how to avoid technology's mythical deviations. The techniques of "human relations" are not the answer, for in the final analysis they are only another way of domesticating and alienating men even further in the service of greater productivity. For this and other reasons that we have expounded in the course of this article, we insist on cultural action for freedom. We do not, however, attribute to conscientization any magical power, which would only be to mythify it. Conscientization is not a magical charm for revolutionaries, but a basic dimension of their reflective action. If men were not "conscious bodies," capable of acting and perceiving, of knowing and re-creating, if they were not conscious of themselves and the world, the idea of conscientization would make no sense — but then, neither would the idea of revolution. Authentic revolutions are undertaken in order to liber-

ate men, precisely because men can know themselves to be oppressed, and be conscious of the oppressive reality in which they exist.

But since, as we have seen, men's consciousness is conditioned by reality, conscientization is first of all the effort to enlighten men about the obstacles preventing them from a clear perception of reality. In this role, conscientization effects the ejection of cultural myths that confuse the people's awareness and make them ambiguous beings.

Because men are historical beings, incomplete and conscious of being incomplete, revolution is as natural and permanent a human dimension as is education. Only a mechanistic mentality holds that education can cease at a certain point, or that revolution can be halted when it attains power. To be authentic, revolution must be a continuous event. Otherwise it will cease to be revolution, and will become sclerotic bureaucracy.

Revolution is always cultural, whether it be in the phase of denouncing an oppressive society and proclaiming the advent of a just society, or in the phase of the new society inaugurated by the revolution. In the new society, the revolutionary process becomes cultural revolution.

Finally, let us clarify the reasons why we have been speaking of cultural action and cultural revolution as distinct moments in the revolutionary process. In the first place, cultural action for freedom is carried out in opposition to the dominating power elite, while cultural revolution takes place in harmony with the revolutionary regime — although this does not mean that it is subordinated to the revolutionary power. All cultural revolution proposes freedom as its goal. Cultural action, on the contrary, if sponsored by the oppressive regime, can be a strategy for domination, in which case it can never become cultural revolution.

The limits of cultural action are set by the oppressive reality itself and by the silence imposed by the power elite. The nature of the oppression, therefore, determines the tactics, which are necessarily different from those employed in cultural revolution. Whereas cultural action for freedom confronts silence both as external fact and introjected reality, cultural revolution confronts it only as introjected reality. Both cultural action for freedom and cultural revolution are an effort to negate the dominat-

ing culture culturally, even before the new culture resulting from that negation has become reality. The new cultural reality itself is continuously subject to negation in favor of the increasing affirmation of men. In cultural revolution, however, this negation occurs simultaneously with the birth of the new culture in the womb of the old.

Both cultural action and cultural revolution imply communion between the leaders and the people, as subjects who are transforming reality. In cultural revolution, however, communion is so firm that the leaders and the people become like one body, checked by a permanent process of self-scrutiny.³⁸ Both cultural action and cultural revolution are founded on scientific knowledge of reality, but in cultural revolution, science is no longer at the service of domination. On two points, however, there is no distinction between cultural action for freedom and cultural revolution. Both are committed to conscientization, and the necessity for each is explained by the "dialectic of overdetermination."

We have spoken of the challenge facing Latin America in this period of historical transition. We believe that other areas of the Third World are no exception to what we have described, though each will present its own particular nuances. If the paths they follow are to lead to liberation, they cannot bypass cultural action for conscientization. Only through such a process can the "maximum of potential consciousness" be attained by the emergent and uncritical masses, and the passage from submersion in semi-intransitiveness to full emergence be achieved. If we have faith in men, we cannot be content with saying that they are human persons while doing nothing concrete so that they may exist as such.

Notes

1. [Conscientization refers to the process in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the sociocultural reality that shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality. See p. 493. — Editor]
2. Re the distinction between men's relationships and the contacts of animals, see Paulo Freire, *Educação como Prática da Liberdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1967).
3. Transcendence in this context signifies the capacity of human consciousness to surpass the limitations of the objective configuration. Without this "transcendental intentionality," consciousness of what exists beyond

- limitations would be impossible. For example, I am aware of how the table at which I write limits me only because I can transcend its limits, and focus my attention on them.
4. "Man, a reasoning animal," said Aristotle.
'Man, a reflective animal,' let us say more exactly today, putting the accent on the evolutionary characteristics of a quality which signifies the passage from a still diffuse consciousness to one sufficiently well centered to be capable of coinciding with itself. Man not only 'a being who knows' but 'a being who knows he knows.' Possessing *consciousness raised to the power of two*. . . . Do we sufficiently feel the radical nature of the difference?" Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Appearance of Man*, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 224.
 5. Marx rejects the transformation of reality by itself in one of his "Theses on Feuerbach (III)," *Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 67-68.
 6. In a discussion of men-world relationships during a *círculo de cultura*, a Chilean peasant affirmed, "I now see that there is no world without men." When the educator asked, "Suppose all men died, but there were still trees, animals, birds, rivers, and stars, wouldn't this be the world?" "No," replied the peasant, "there would be no one to say, this is the world."
 7. We refer to behaviorism as studied in John Beloff's *The Existence of Mind* (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), Introduction.
 8. Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1932), p. 198.
 9. "The Tiger does not 'de-tigerize' itself," said Ortega y Gasset in one of his works.
 10. See Teilhard de Chardin, *The Appearance of Man*.
 11. Karl Marx, *Capital*.
 12. This is proper to men's social relations, which imply their relationship to their world. That is why the traditional aristocratic dichotomy between manual work and intellectual work is no more than a myth. All work engages the whole man as an indivisible unity. A factory hand's work can no more be divided into manual or intellectual than ours in writing this article. The only distinction that can be made between these forms of work is the predominance of the kind of effort demanded by the work: muscular-nervous effort or intellectual effort. Concerning this point, see Antonio Gramsci, *Cultura y Literatura* (Madrid: Ediciones Península, 1967), p. 31.
 13. See Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx* (Paris: Librairie François Maspero, 1965).
 14. José Luis Fiori, in a letter to the author. José Luis Fiori was an assistant to the author on his Chilean team to ICIRA, one of the best institutes of its type in the Third World.
 15. It is interesting to note how this happens with the churches. The concept "mission lands" originates in the metropolis. For a mission land to exist, there must be another that defines it as such. There is a significant coincidence between mission-sending nations and metropolises as there is between mission lands and the Third World. It would seem to us that, on the contrary, all lands constitute mission territory to the Christian perspective.
 16. Re "closed societies," see Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. A. Audra and C. Brereton (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954); and Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949).
 17. This mode of consciousness is still found to be predominant in Latin American rural areas where large property holdings (*latifundios*) are the rule. The rural areas constitute "closed societies" that maintain the "culture of silence" intact.
 18. See Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press, 1970).
 19. See Freire, *Educação como Prática da Liberdade*.
 20. It is essential that modernization of backward structures ejects the sources of the magic rites that are an integral part of the structures. If not, while it may do away with the phenomenon of magic rites themselves, modernization will proceed to mythologize technology. The myth of technology will replace the magical entities that formerly explained problematical situations. Further, the myth of technology might be seen, not as the substitute for the old forces that, in this case, continue to exist, but as something superior even to them. Technology would thus be projected as all-powerful, beyond all structures, accessible only to a few privileged men.
 21. The abolition of slavery in Brazil brought about the inversion of capital in incipient industries, and stimulated the first waves of German, Italian, and Japanese immigration to the south-central and southern Brazilian states.
 22. Although we have not made a precise study of the emergence of black consciousness in the United States, we are tempted to state that, especially in southern areas, there are divergencies between the younger and older generations that cannot be explained by psychological criteria, but rather by a dialectical understanding of the process of the emerging consciousness. The younger generation, less influenced by fatalism than the older, must logically assume positions qualitatively different from the older generation, not only in regard to passive silence, but also in regard to the methods used by their protest movements.
 23. See the excellent study on "The Role of Poetry in the Mozambican Revolution," *Africa Today*, 16, No. 2 (1969).
 24. In Latin America, the Mexican, Bolivian, and Cuban revolutions broke open the closed structures of rural areas. Only Cuba, however, succeeded in making this change permanent. Mexico frustrated its revolution, and the Bolivian revolutionary movement was defeated. Nevertheless, the presence of the peasant in the social life of both Mexico and Bolivia is an indisputable fact as a result of that initial opening.
 25. Francisco Weffort, in his introduction to Paulo Freire's *Educação como Prática da Liberdade*, points out that ambiguity is the principal characteristic of populism. A professor of sociology, Weffort is one of the best Brazil-

- ian analysts of populism today. The Center for the Study of Development and Social Change in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has recently issued a translation of this introduction, by Loretta Slover, for restricted circulation.
26. By the same phenomenon of the people's reversion to silence, Althusser explains how it was possible for the Russian people to put up with the crimes of Stalin's repression.
 27. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Hegemonía Burguesa e Independencia Económica; Raízes Estruturais da Crise Política Brasileira," in *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, 17 (January 1968).
 28. Re radicalization and its opposite, sectarianism, see Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.
 29. Re biophilia and necrophilia, see Erich Fromm, *The Heart of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
 30. Lucien Goldman, *The Human Science and Philosophy* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).
 31. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, discusses both these forms of cultural action.
 32. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Para leer el capital* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1969).
 33. One must reject the myth that any criticism of necrophilic bureaucracies that swallow up revolutionary proclamation strengthens the Right. The opposite is true. Silence, not criticism, in this case would renounce the proclamation and be a capitulation to the Right.
 34. See Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.
 35. See Gabriel Marcel, *Man against Mass Society*, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: A Gateway Edition, 1962).
 36. In a recent conversation with the author, the psychoanalyst Michael Maccoby, Dr. Fromm's assistant, stated that his research suggests a relationship between mythologizing technology and necrophilic attitudes.
 37. "Professionals who seek self-realization through creative and autonomous behavior without regard to the defined goals, needs, and channels of their respective departments have no more place in a large corporation or government agency than squeamish soldiers in the Army. . . . The social organization of the new Technology, by systematically denying to the general population experiences which are analogous to those of its higher management, contributes very heavily to the growth of social irrationality in our society." John MacDermott, "Technology: The Opiate of Intellectuals," *New York Review of Books*, No. 2 (July 31, 1969).
 38. Even though these statements on cultural revolution can be applied to an analysis of the Chinese cultural revolution and beyond, that is not our intention. We restrict our study to a sketch of the relationship between cultural revolution and cultural action, which we propose.